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One of the great strengths of Friemann’s paper on reducing conflict is the emphasis he puts
on emotions and emotion-laden states. The presentation of argumentation and dialectical
disagreement given by most philosophers treats arguers as if they were emotionless, or as if they
should be. For example, of the 66 papers at this OSSA Conference only 3 or 4 consider emotionladen states in an important way. Yet it is hard to find many examples of actual-world
argumentation and dialectical reasoning where emotions do not play a strong part.
1.
The central focus of Friemann’s paper is the concept of identification (or fusion). Friemann
traces a theme in the recent literature on reducing or resolving deep conflicts: for a dialogue to
develop in deep conflicts, so this theme runs, participants should empathize with one another, at
least as far as possible. They should not, on the other hand, go so far as to identify with one
another. Identification, in contrast to empathy, is a dangerous state of mind to develop.
Friemann traces this mistrust of identification back to its roots in therapy, to Carl Rogers and
others. It is the dangers of identification that Friemann wants to question.
In opposition to this theme, Friemann maintains that in deep conflicts, between ordinary
people, identification is not appreciably dangerous at all. The fact that the conflict is a deep one,
and that it occurs between ordinary people (rather than between therapist and client), are central
parts of Friemann’s position. In such conflicts, Friemann argues, the chances that identification
will occur are very slim. Rather, identification is an ideal that participants should aspire to—
even if it is unlikely (because their conflicts are so deep) that they will ever succeed in
identifying (or fusing) with the other.
Friemann begins in a therapeutic setting and spells out what is meant by identification. He
does this by contrasting it with empathy: It is helpful, maybe essential, for a therapist to
empathize with her client; it is dangerous, maybe harmful, for a therapist to identify with her
client.
What is the difference between the two? I hope you already have an intuitive grasp of the
difference, because spelling out that difference will be one focus of my commentary.
Friemann goes on: The relationship that holds between ordinary people who are locked in
deep conflict is entirely different from the relationship that holds between therapists and patients.
It is difficult enough for people in deep disagreements even to empathize with one another; they
are extremely unlikely to identify with one another. So there is very little danger of
identification actually occurring. Therefore, it should be held up as a goal or ideal in those
situations.
Near the end of his paper, Friemann even offers some practical techniques that might help a
participant approach the ideal of identification with the other.
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I want to focus on two aspects of Friemann’s paper, and as part of the second one, I am
going to conclude that Friemann is wrong. I will argue that we should not hold up identification
as a goal–even among ordinary people, even in deep conflicts—because it is dangerous and often
harmful.
2.
I want to begin by showing how unsatisfactory all the specifications of empathy and
identification are to an analytic philosopher. Indeed, if I weren’t already quite familiar with the
two states, the words these famous therapists use to spell them out would never help me see what
they were talking about.
Friemann begins spelling out the difference by quoting an early definition of Carl Rogers’:
The state of empathy or being empathetic, is to perceive the internal frame of reference of
another with accuracy and with the emotional components and meanings which pertain
thereto as if one were the person, but without ever losing the ‘as if’ condition. Thus it
means to sense the hurt or the pleasure of another as he senses it and to perceive the
causes thereof as he perceives them, but without ever losing the recognition that it is as if
I were hurt or pleased and so forth. If this ‘as if’ quality is lost, then the state is one of
identification (p.6).

Friemann comments that “Here Rogers warns us three times not to lose the ‘as if’ condition
or we will end up with identification” (p. 6).
(A great deal will be made of this “as if” part (by Friemann, Rogers and others), but I find it
seriously misleading. (I’ll try to show why near the end of this paper.))
When therapists identify with their clients, they are in a state of confusion. Some theorists
think it’s a confusion of identities, others that it is a confusion of experience.
The problem with identification is a “confusion of identity”: “A therapist is allowed to feel
what his client feels as long as he realizes it is the client’s feeling that he is feeling. In emotional
identification, it appears that the therapist can’t make the distinction between his patient and
himself” (p. 8).
On p. 9 Friemann is discussing Arnett’s idea that it is irresponsible for therapists to identify
with their clients. Friemann says: “There doesn’t seem to be any irresponsibility in feeling what
another feels while being aware that it is not your feeling.”
(I think I know what Friemann is trying to get at, but it is hard to say it clearly. What could it
possibly mean to feel what another feels while knowing it isn’t your feeling? If I’m feeling it,
then it is my feeling. The words used are not helping.)
With an air of making matters clearer, Friemann quotes two psychotherapists:
. . . the therapist must be careful not to confuse his or her experience with that of the
client’s or get lost in the client’s experience. One is to enter the client’s experience on an
“as if” basis but never to lose the sense of distinction between self and client.

Friemann then comments: “The concept of experience is more limited than the concept of
identity, so presumably one could become confused over whether or not an experience belonged
to oneself or another, while not being confused about one’s identity” (p. 10).
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As Dave Barry would say: I am not making this up! Taking the words at all literally, how
would any of this work? Suppose the therapist is in the midst of identifying with a client. So we
ask her, “Who are you?” Would the therapist, having “a confusion of identity,” not know
whether she was herself or someone else? Or we ask, “Is this your own experience or your
client’s?” Would the therapist, having a “confusion of experience,” not know whether it’s her
own or someone else’s?
The attempts to spell out empathy and identification and the differences between the two are
almost unbelievably convoluted and confusing. I don’t want to lay this at Friemann’s feet: all
the specifications, by later theorists as well as Rogers, grope to characterize these states of minds
in words that manifestly don’t do the job—at least not for anyone who is careful about language.
3.
I think I know what Friemann, Rogers, and the other theorists are talking about when they
try to spell out what identification and empathy are. But I know this from previous acquaintance
with the concepts in practice. I don’t think that the words of Rogers or Friemann or anyone else
in this debate would help me to understand the concepts if I did not understand them already.
Here’s an example of identification in a therapeutic setting. A man and a woman come to a
therapist for marriage counseling. The man describes how the woman “mistreated” him and how
angry he is about it. The therapist too becomes angry with the woman. That’s a case of
identification.
The therapist is not “confusing” her identity or her experience with the man’s—we could
describe it that way, but only by risking a lot of misunderstanding. Nor is she really “getting
lost” in the man’s feeling—though this description for me comes closer. What she is doing has
two aspects: one, she is feeling anger herself, and, two, there is something inappropriate about
this. She, the therapist, is angry, and it is inappropriate for her to actually be angry in this
situation. What’s more, she is angry with the woman. It is directed anger. She is taking sides.
She is not empathizing with both (whether both are present or not).
The inappropriateness is a key part of what happens in identification, and it can take any
number of forms. You can see why Rogers and other theorists use such a convoluted description
to capture identification: The therapist is angry, in this example, even though nothing has been
done to her. Any alleged mistreatment was done to the married man, not to the therapist.
Experientially, the therapist’s anger is almost jolting in its inappropriateness. We might
wonder, “What’s she got to be angry about? Nobody did anything to her!” We might even
conclude that the therapist has her own issues and that these are playing a major part in her
reaction of anger. Far from feeling his anger, she may well be projecting her own.
With empathy, by contrast, the therapist wouldn’t be angry at all. She would allow herself
to see the situation as the man sees it; she would get hold of his perspective. Now we can see
why Rogers uses that “as if” description: he means that the therapist is not in fact angry at all;
she is not feeling anger. Rather, it is as if she is angry. What does this mean?
In empathizing with the husband, the therapist is able
(a) to maintain her therapeutic distance,
(b) to know what he is feeling,
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(c) to realize how one could well have those feelings in this situation, and
(d) to understand how having those feelings would be valid from his perspective.
With empathy, the therapist could say, “Oh, I know what it feels like to be unfairly treated,
and I know how a person could well feel unfairly treated in the circumstances you describe.”
In addition, empathizing with the man allows her
(e) to empathize also with the woman.
Notice that in empathy there is a cognitive component that seems to be lacking in
identification. That is, in empathy there is a good deal of intellectual as well as emotional
openness; there is a lot of thinking-things-through-from-the-other-person’s-perspective. In
identification, by contrast, any cognitive component (understanding intellectually what is going
on) is likely to be overwhelmed by the emotions.
In the therapist’s case, identification is inappropriate. By becoming angry herself in
response to the man’s story, her feelings and reactions are inappropriate in at least four ways.
They are inappropriate with respect to beliefs she holds (the theoretical principles that guide her
therapy); with respect to her role in relation to the conflict (she is a therapist, not a party to the
conflict); with respect to the distance she should be maintaining; and they are inappropriate with
respect to who she in fact is (she is not him—she is not the person who was mistreated).
Friemann clearly recognizes that identification is inappropriate for the therapist. The
question is: Is it similarly inappropriate to identify with someone in a non-therapeutic context,
specifically when two people are engaged in deep conflict?
4.
Friemann maintains that identification is extremely unlikely in cases of deep conflict. That
is part of his reason for thinking that it’s not really a danger in such situations. Since it’s virtually
unachievable, it can function as an ideal. If I am in deep conflict with you, the ideal would be to
identify with you—to “feel your feelings” (without the buffering “as if”), and thus feel the full
impact of your side.
I’m not so sure that identification is as uncommon in deep conflicts as Friemann thinks it is.
He might be right if strong emotions followed a logical course of action. If fascism and
communism were purely sets of beliefs, we would not see people go from one to the other
without passing through all those more centrist political views that lie between them. In fact,
though, “flip-flopping” from fascism to communism is not all that unusual. It is far more usual
than passing from fascism to conservatism to liberalism to communism.
Linda Lovelace became a born-again Christian. So did Saul of Tarsus. Raging death-penalty
advocates and raging death-penalty opponents sometimes flip to the other side, displaying their
fervor now for the side they were just ragefully against. Ronald Reagan went from socialist to
right-winger without going through the intermediate stages.
Strong emotions don’t necessarily follow a gradual path when they change. People involved
in deep conflict–where there is a heavy commitment of emotion to the exclusive righteousness of
their own side and the utter wrongness of the other side—can easily flip-flop. (I’m not, of course,
maintaining that this is common—only that it is not all that unusual.)
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It’s partly the result, I think, of the extremity of the emotions involved. Suppose I relish
strong emotions; I attach them to my own point of view exclusively; and I am in deep conflict
with you on the other side. Then I find something unexpectedly “wrong” with my own position
(or something unexpectedly “right” with yours). There is nothing especially impossible about
flipping totally to your side. That is how conversion often works.
I believe identification plays a big role in this. At least, it is one common mechanism by
which people flip from one extreme viewpoint to the opposite. Saul identifies with a Christ he’s
been persecuting; the death-penalty advocate sees “Dead Man Walking” and identifies with the
criminal’s anguish; the death-penalty opponent suddenly identifies with a murder victim.
Empathy produces a more measured reaction. Since it allows people to keep their distance
while understanding another’s feelings, and since it allows an empathetic understanding even of
opposing sides, it doesn’t lend itself so readily to flipping sides. (An empathetic Saul would say
something a lot less extreme than the identifying Saul: “Ah. I see how unpleasant it must be to
be persecuted, and I now see how your actions seem appropriate to you, given that you believe
you’ve discovered the true faith. From now on, I’m not only going to stop persecuting
Christians, I’m going to stop telling people how they ought to live.”)
5.
Finally, I want to maintain that identification retains its inappropriateness even in nontherapeutic settings, even when parties are in deep conflict.
Suppose A and B are getting divorced—and they are in deep conflict. Each believes the
other would be an unhealthy parent for their daughter. Each wants custody. Each is furious at
the other. (I’ve included three states of mind: a belief, a want, and an emotion–in fact a directed
emotion.)
This is deep conflict. Part of what makes it deep is the conviction that the other parent would
be bad for the daughter. You can see why Friemann thinks identification is unlikely in such a
situation. But I would argue that, likely or not, it still would not be beneficial—precisely because
of the inappropriateness that accompanies identification.
It would be inappropriate for A to “take on” any one of those states of mind. Consider the
belief. Given that A believes B would be a bad parent, A should certainly not identify with B and
take on the belief that B would be a good parent. That would be to abandon, without reason, A’s
previous belief.
Similarly, A should not identify with B to the extent of taking on her want. B, after all,
wants custody. Identifying with that want amounts to A’s abandoning A’s own want (and his
belief as well).
Finally, it make no sense for A to identify with B’s emotion. B is furious: it would not help
the conflict for A to feel furious. And it would involve great self-abandonment for A to be
furious at himself.
None of these helps with conflict resolution. And none of them is appropriate. None of
these constitutes the “ideal” that Friemann depicts.
What, then, should A do? What would help?
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A should empathize with B. The empathy maintains a distance while still allowing A to see
and understand the situation as B sees it. Or at least—and here’s that “as if” again—A, while
remaining A, should feel the validity for B of how B sees things. By empathizing, A can start to
understand how B could see A as a bad parent. A can be (as Friemann insightfully stresses)
emotionally and intellectually open to B’s beliefs—but without the self-abandonment of taking
them on himself. Similarly, empathizing can reveal to A how B’s want (to have custody), and
even her fury at him, make sense—from her perspective.
6.
Finally, at the back of Friemann’s thesis, I think, is the belief that there is a continuum
running from empathy to identification—in the sense that both are ways of helping parties “more
adequately understand the emotional aspects of the conflict” (p. 1). Identification would allow
this understanding to a significantly greater degree than empathy would.
I think Friemann is led down this path by the confusing way Rogers and others speak about
identification and empathy. When A identifies with B, these theorists say, A feels B’s feelings;
A confuses himself and his experiences with B and her experiences. This sounds as though A is
getting in touch with B’s feelings in a singularly profound way—A is actually feeling B’s
feelings himself!
But I don’t think this is so. People, of course, can’t really feel other people’s anger. That’s
just a confusing façon de parler. All A can feel is A’s own anger: obviously. In the case of
identification, A’s anger is triggered by hearing B’s story, by seeing how much B is hurting. A
feels anger (A’s own anger, remember), even though nothing has been done to A. That’s
confused; that’s inappropriate.
What happens in identification is that A imaginatively places himself in B’s situation, and
that triggers A’s own mechanisms of anger. Far from bringing A and B closer together,
identification is far more likely to be a result of projection.
I have argued that empathy and identification are different in kind. Empathy allows distance
to remain. Identification does not. Empathy is cognitive: it is, partly at least, aimed at
cognitively understanding the other. Identification is not: the effect of identification is to be
feeling strong emotions, without much cause. In identification, a person abandons her own
beliefs, desires, and emotions—even her identity—and “takes on” those of another. This is
inappropriate whether she is a therapist or a party to a deep conflict.

